IV. To the Initial Arguments for the Other Side

84. To the initial arguments for the opposite.

To the first [n.37] I say that, just as guiltiness or obligation to a penalty (which alone remains after the passing of the act, interior and exterior, in a sin) is a being, because it is a being of reason and so a positive being, consequently too non-guiltiness or non-obligation or non-debt is a privation of a being of reason. And thus, if there were anywhere a passage of reason from obligation to non-obligation, it would be a privative or corruptive change of reason. But it would not anywhere be either in an act of the divine will, or in an object as it is object, or in an object as it exists outside - unless it be said that, to the extent it is in the object outside, to that extent the object is in the ‘now’ for which the act of the divine will regards the object. And then, for the object outside to pass from ‘not being in that now’ to ‘being in that now’ is for it to change concomitantly with a change of reason from ‘being obligated’ to ‘not being obligated’. When therefore you argue that there is no corruptive change, because its term ‘from which’ is not anything positive, I deny it. Nor yet is a fault anything positive, nor does it remain, but the obligation that follows the commission of a fault is something positive and it remains.

85. The second argument [n.38], about prior and posterior, is something pondered in this matter by others, because when positing a distinction between these changes they seek for an order between them [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.17 q.1 a.4; Richard of Middleton Sent. IV d17 princ.4 q.4].

86. I say briefly, then, that according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics ‘On the Prior’ [5.11.1019a2-14 and 9.8.1049b17-21, 9.1050a4-7], some things are prior in generation, others in perfection. And these priorities are commonly disposed to each other conversely, for the more imperfect things are prior by way of generation. I say in this manner that if the expulsion of guilt were some being, and the infusion of grace likewise, the expulsion of guilt would be prior by way of generation; but, conversely, the infusion of grace would be prior by way of perfection, because it is more immediate to the end, which is what is simply perfect in this order. Similarly in the case of priority of consequence it is plain that the more imperfect is prior, just as animal according to consequence is prior to man, and universally the consequent is more imperfect than the antecedent.In the consequence ‘if.. .then...’, the antecedent entails the consequent but not vice versa, as that ‘if it is a man, it is an animal’ but not ‘if it is an animal, it is a man’. So ‘animal’ is prior to ‘man’ in the sense that in order to be a man it is necessary to be an animal, but it is not necessary to be a man in order to be an animal. The consequent (animal) is thus not only prior to but also more imperfect than the antecedent (man), because it does not include the antecedent but the antecedent does include it. ⁴⁵ So, in the way in which there would be a consequence between them, expulsion would follow on infusion, not conversely, for they are not immediate opposites simply by nature of being extremes, but by divine institution. But the introduction of one does not follow on the removal of the other save in the case of opposites immediate in themselves.The correct consequence is, ‘if there is infusion, there is expulsion’ but not ‘if there is expulsion, there is infusion’. The reason is that expulsion and infusion are not immediate opposites simply by the nature of their extremes but by divine institution. For instance, non-x and x are immediate opposites by the nature of the extremes, so that if one then not the other (if non-x then not x, and if x then not non-x). But expulsion of guilt and infusion of grace are not immediate opposites by reason of the extremes ‘guilt’ and ‘grace’, but by divine institution. For while by that institution expulsion of guilt and infusion of grace go together, there is no necessity in the nature of ‘grace’ and ‘guilt’ that they should, or that the removal of the one extreme, guilt, should necessitate the presence of the other, grace. ⁴⁶

87. But whether the expulsion of guilt follows on grace is doubtful, since they are not formally opposed, as was proved in the third argument and the first conclusion of the solution [n.42].

88. But one could say, denying this [n.87], that to be a friend to God and an enemy to him is a contradiction: by grace one is a friend, by guilt one is an enemy;     therefore etc     .Sc. therefore grace and guilt are opposed as contradictories, and so as immediate extremes. ⁴⁷

89. But this is not cogent, because ‘friendship through grace’ means to be ordained to life eternal, ‘enmity through guilt’ means to be ordained to a fitting penalty; these can stand together, though not for the same ‘now’. At any rate, in whatever way they are opposites, there seems to be a formal consequence from ‘grace is present’ to ‘guilt is not present’ rather than conversely, because in the second case the antecedent in no way entails the consequent.The consequence that ‘if grace is present, then guilt is not present’ holds; but the converse (the ‘second case’) that ‘if guilt is not present, then grace is present’ does not hold. ⁴⁸

90. But if a question is asked about the priority of causality between them, I reply: the question does not arise. For neither is the negation of obligation (which is only a negation of a being of reason) a cause of grace nor conversely, because the divine will alone by its own justice determines the obligation, or determines by its mercy nonobligation.

91. And if you ask what order these have (grace and guilt) as they are secondary objects of the divine will - I reply as was said in Ord. I d.41 nn.40-42, ‘On Predestination’: in the way in which there is an order of divine volition in relation to secondary objects, God first wills what is nearer to the end; and so for this person for time a, namely after he has sinned, God wills grace simply first rather than not to exact vengeance, speaking of priority of intention. But just as he wills the execution to be converse to the intention (and therefore he wills this person to have merits before grace, and through merits glory), so he wills that in the order of nature guilt not be present in this person before grace is present.

92. Or if it be said that by ‘present’ and ‘not present’ nothing is posited in this person externally but only as he is object of divine volition, one can in consequence say that these secondary objects have a certain order according to perfection as the divine will tends toward them, but that according to causality and generation they have no order, etc.